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MATHEMATICS AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: 
A RESPONSE TO PAUL. EDELMAN 
Michael I. Meyerson' 
I was very flattered to read Paul A. Edelman's review of my 
book, Political Numeracy.2 He is a first-rate mathematician and 
legal thinker, so his kind words are very much appreciated and 
his criticisms are taken seriously.3 
My goal in writing the book was to explore different aspects 
of the multifaceted relationship between mathematics and the 
Constitution. The Constitution itself contains many numbers, 
and the very heart of democracy, the concept of "majority rule", 
is an arithmetic concept. I wanted to examine the reasoning be-
hind the framers' numerical choices-why 2/3 of the Senate is 
needed to ratify treaties; why slaves were counted as 3/5 of a 
"person"; and why we have two houses of Congress and 538 
presidential electors.4 I also wanted to explore the nature of 
logic, both the logic used in the presentation of legal arguments 
and the dangers that result from not questioning the fundamen-
tal postulates of one's own reasoning. On the whole, Professor 
Edelman has positive things to say about my approaches to these 
first two goals.s . 
I.Professor of Law and Piper and Marbury Faculty Fellow, Baltimore Univer-
sity. 
2. Michael I. Meyerson, Political Numeracy: Mathematical Perspectives on Our 
Chaotic Constitution (W.W. Norton, 2002). 
3. I was especially pleased that Professor Edelman approved of my attempt to ex-
plain mathematical concepts to those who have avoided the subject for years: "Meyer-
son's mathematical introductions are surprisingly good, especially given the limited space 
they are allotted. They are smoothly written and give a friendly introduction to lot of at-
tractive mathematics." Paul H. Edelman, The Law and Large Numbers, 19 Const. Comm. 
459,470 (2002). 
4. The Constitution does not specify the actual number of Electors, only the for-
mula for determining how many Electors each state is allotted. Art. I, §1, cL2. See also 
Amend. XXIII. 
5. As for my study of the numbers within the Constitution, which he terms "tech-
nical mathematics," Professor Edelman writes, "It is in chapters 2-4 that Meyerson is best 
able to support his claim that mathematics can illuminate legal thinking. In these chap-
ters he examines voting rules-including ruminations on the benefits of the electoral col-
lege-considers the super-majority aspects of the Constitution, and discusses the difficul-
ties in apportioning seats in Congress. With interesting mathematics to be discussed and 
interesting law to ponder, this is the best part of the book." Edelman, The Law and 
Large Numbers at 463 (cited in note 3). 
Regarding my discussion of logic, Professor Edelman writes, "Meyerson's use of general 
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My final goal was to explore how an understanding of vari-
ous areas of modern mathematics could inform and improve our 
thinking about the constitution. This is the part of the book 
which receives Professor Edelman's strongest criticisms. He as-
serts that the use of what he terms "mathematical metaphor" is 
essentially a waste of time. As he put it, the more one knows 
about mathematics and the law, "the less persuasive these meta-
phors tend to be." 
I suspect that Professor Edelman's background as a mathe-
matician is preventing him from seeing that mathematics can 
trigger a non-mathematical imagination and create mental im-
ages that permit new ways of thinking about non-mathematical 
topics. 
Mathematics is not simply a tool for resolving problems. 
Despite its reputation for being tedious, inaccessible, and boring, 
mathematics is actually a glorious way of thinking, with a deeply 
aesthetic quality. The poetry of mathematics can illuminate all 
manner of thought. 
Consider, for example, this passage from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Sr.'s pre-Civil War essay, The Autocrat of the Breakfast 
Table: "All economical and practical wisdom is an extension of 
the· following arithmetical formula: 2 + 2= 4. Every philosophi-
cal proposition has the character of the expression a + b = c. We 
are mere operatives, empirics, and egotists until we learn to 
think in letters instead of figures. ,,6 
All thinkers, especially those engaged in legal analysis, can 
benefit from this admonition to reason abstractly, in the univer-
sal rather than the particular. Math does not serve as a mere 
"metaphor," but creates an effective means for reexamining 
one's thoughts. 
Likewise, James Madison used a simple mathematical pic-
ture in Federalist No. 10, to describe how a national government 
minimizes the evils of majority factions: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of 
logic is impeccablc, but I will question if its usc is distinctly mathematical. .... He re-
minds us that it is important to make clear what onc is assuming and what one is conclud-
ing in any argument, but particularly in legal oncs, where it is easy to leavc the hypothe-
ses unstated. The more transparent the logic, the better it can be assessed." rd. at 461-63. 
6. Oliver Wendcll Holmes, Sr., The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table 1 (Phillips, 
Sampson, and Co., 1858). 
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other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be 
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength, and to act in unison with each other.7 
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Obviously, when Madison referred to a "sphere" he was not 
contemplating a literal geometric shape. Rather, he was creating 
a mental picture of a container increasing in size, to encompass a 
larger geographic area. Moreover, his basic point was inherently 
mathematical: The larger the voting population, the more diffi-
cult it is to maintain a permanent working majority. 
I believe that what Laurence Tribe wrote about the legal 
import of modern physics holds for modern mathematics as well: 
"my conjecture is that the metaphors and intuitions that guide 
physicists can enrich our comprehension of social and legal is-
sues."g 
Professor Edelman notes, without significant analysis, my 
discussion of topology. To understand this discussion, one needs 
to know that topology is a novel way of considering geometrical 
figures. It views shapes as flexible, as if drawn on a piece of Silly 
Putty. Topology asks what properties remain unchanged after a 
figure is continuously bent and stretched, without being cut or 
torn. For example, a donut can have a large or small hole, and 
still be a donut, but you must preserve some hole for the new 
shape to be "topologically equivalent" to the original. 
The concept of flexibility within limits is essential for a so-
phisticated understanding of constitutional law, and I believe 
that topology offers one way of illustrating that concept. The 
evolution of the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence can 
be captured with a topological picture. 
Imagine federal power as the ring of the donut and the 
states' residual power as the hole. In my book, I write: "Over 
time, the size of the hole has grown and shrunk relative to the 
size of the sphere, but the hole must remain if the Constitution's 
topological structure is to remain intact".9 In other words, the 
scope of federal power grew enormously during the twentieth 
century, but that expansion ended with United States v. Lopez, 10 
when the Court ruled that there were constitutional limits on 
7. Federalist 10 (Madison) in Clinton Rossiter, cd., The Federalist Papers 51 (Men-
tor, 1961) (emphasis added). 
8. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1,2 (1989). 
9. Meyerson, Political Numeracy at 138 (cited in note 2). 
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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federal commerce clause power, and, in particular, that Congress 
had no power to make mere gun possession near school property 
a federal offense. Particularly noteworthy was the plaintive end-
ing to Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision, that the Court was 
"unwilling" to concede, "that there never will be a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local."!! 
The idea that the extent of federal power need not be rigid 
for all time, but that there must always be some issues reserved 
to the states, can be framed in many different ways. Picturing 
Lopez as "preserving the hole" can be one effective illustration. 
Professor Edelman also criticizes my discussion of "Consti-
tutional Chaos." In mathematical terms, chaos occurs under cer-
tain very specific conditions. One major characteristic of chaotic 
systems is the concept of feedback or "iteration.,,!2 In a series of 
calculations, the result of your next calculation is determined in 
part by the solution to your previous one. 
Another characteristic of chaotic systems is that even the ti-
niest error completely changes the results. Thus, for chaotic sys-
tems, long-range prediction is impossible. In the absence of per-
fect, super-human knowledge, mistakes are inevitable, and the 
variations caused by the smallest error increase dramatically 
over time. 
In my book, I propose that the essence of constitutional in-
terpretation has much in common with a dynamic, chaotic sys-
tem. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the mathematical con-
cept of iteration is paralleled by the Supreme Court's use of its 
own precedent to decide future cases. Since our knowledge of 
the intent of the framers is incomplete, anyone attempting to in-
terpret the Constitution according to the framers' understanding 
is bound to make errors. Over time, as implied by the theory of 
chaos, this lack of precision will result in a very different consti-
tutional path from what the framers would have expected. The 
inevitability of error limits the capacity of modern constitutional 
rules to reflect original intent. 
Professor Edelman objects to this analysis: 
Meyerson assumes a very mechanistic form of legal rulemak-
ing in which the outcome of each case is completely decided 
by previous decisions. He has to take this view if he wants to 
11. Id. at 567-68. 
12. Robert L. Devaney, Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems 2 (Perseus, 2nd 
cd. 1989). 
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view constitutional interpretation through a chaotic lens, be-
cause his chaotic model is dependent on the system being de-
terministic. 13 
481 
At no point do I say that the system is deterministic, such 
that the Court blindly follows precedent from one case to the 
next. Moreover, I go out of my way to say that, "the unquantifi-
able nature of Constitutional doctrine and structure make formal 
modeling impossible,,14 Unlike Professor Edelman, however, I 
strongly believe that the lessons from chaos theory are still valu-
able for the constitutional scholar. 
Where I differ most from Professor Edelman is in my con-
viction that mathematical imagery and concepts can open the 
mind, even absent a perfect analogue. Much of modern mathe-
matics is based on the surprising inability to obtain precision and 
certainty. I remain convinced that an understanding of this as-
pect of mathematics can facilitate an appreciation of the diffi-
culty, if not the impossibility, of guaranteeing the certainty of 
our own legal conclusions. This newfound humility, I submit, 
would benefit all of us greatly. 
13. Edelman, The Law and Large Numbers, 19 Const. Comm. at 474 (cited in note 
3). 
14. Meyerson, Political Numeracy at 196-97 (cited in note 2). 
